Chhattisgarh HC junks doctors' plea for study leave extension from 24 to 36 months
Bilaspur: In a recent ruling, the Chhattisgarh High Court reiterated that an order passed today is presumed not to operate retrospectively to past events.
With this, the HC bench of Justice Bibhu Datta Guru recently dismissed a batch of petitions filed by serving government doctors (dental surgeons) who sought an extension of their study leave from 24 months to 36 months.
The bench held that a subsequent government order enhancing the ceiling of study leave cannot be applied retrospectively to increase leave periods for those who had already been sanctioned or had availed leave under the earlier legal regime.
In its ruling, the Single Judge bench relied on the Supreme Court order in CIT v. M.C. Ponnoose, where the top court bench held that persons or authorities exercising subordinate legislative functions cannot make a rule, regulation, or bye-law that operates with retrospective effect.
Accordingly, the Chhattisgarh HC bench observed, "In view of the above decision rendered by the Supreme Court, the law is well settled that unless a contrary intention appears, a legislation is presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective operation. The said principle squarely applies to the controversy involved in the present case."
"The Government order dated 03.03.2025, while relaxing the provisions of Rule 44 of the Rules, 2010 and permitting study leave up to a maximum period of 36 months, does not contain any express provision giving it retrospective operation so as to reopen or enlarge an earlier sanction of 24 months' study leave which had already been availed by the petitioners. Nor does any necessary implication arise from the language of the said order which would require such retrospective enlargement. The mere fact that the permissible ceiling was enhanced to 36 months cannot, in the absence of such clear intention, confer upon the petitioners a fresh entitlement to an additional period of 12 months...No such express retrospective mandate has been demonstrated before this Court," it further observed.
"The mere fact that the Government subsequently enhanced the permissible period cannot be treated as sufficient to reopen the leave which had already been sanctioned and availed under the earlier regime," clarified the High Court.
Case Background:
The plea before the High Court was filed by Dental Surgeons under the Department of Health and Family Welfare, Government of Chhattisgarh. They were issued No Objection Certificates (NOC) and departmental permissions to pursue postgraduate education and were granted study leave under the prevailing framework of Rule 44 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 2010.
In the case of the doctor in the leading petition, the petitioner was granted 24 months of study leave for a period between December 2, 2022 and December 1, 2024. The order in this regard was passed on August 18, 2023.
For the subsequent third year of her postgraduate course, the petitioner was granted 12 months of extraordinary leave from December 2, 2024 to December 1, 2025. Therefore, before March 2025, the petitioner had been fully sanctioned the original study leave entitlement and had also availed the same.
Thereafter, on March 3, 2025, the State Government issued an order and relaxed the provisions of Rule 44 of the 2010 Rules and as a result, the maximum permissible study leave ceiling for in-service doctors pursuing MD/MS courses was enhanced up to 36 months, subject to specific conditions, including a mandatory five-year service bond and financial recovery with 8% compound interest in case of breach
Later, the Department issued an administrative communication dated 06.04.2026 and clarified that the benefit of the March 3, 2025 order would be available to doctors who proceed for higher studies after obtaining permission/NOC after that date.
Consequently, aggrieved by the State's refusal to convert their 12-month extraordinary leave into sanctioned study leave, the petitioner-doctors approached the High Court seeking direction upon the authorities to modify and sanction their study leave from 24 months to 36 months.
The counsel for the petitioners submitted that the order dated 03.03.2025 was a beneficial measure issued after obtaining proper concurrence from the Finance Department. Further, the counsel contended that the petitioners could not be placed in a disadvantageous position merely because their original sanction was ordered before the order dated March 3, 2025 as they had pursued their courses transparently adn had obtained proper permissions and sanctions.
Further, the petitioners challenged the departmental communication dated April 6, 2026 and argued that an administrative instruction not issued in the name of the Governor could not curtail benefits conferred under the parent order dated 03.03.2025. They relied on the Supreme Court order in the case of P.D. Aggarwal v. State of U.P.
Apart from this, the petitioners also alleged hostile discrimination by referring to an order dated 13.06.2025, in the case of a doctor, where the initial grant of two years' of study leave and one year of extraordinary leave had been amended to a full three-year study leave under the relaxation granted in March 2025.
On the other hand, the counsel for the State argued that the petitioners had already availed their sanctioned 24 months of study leave under the regime prevailing at that relevant time. According to the State, the relaxation order dated 03.03.2025 operated prospectively and contained no language directing the automatic reopening of concluded leave sanctions.
Referring to the contention of hostile discrimination, the State submitted that the Finance Department had dissented by a communication dated 13.02.2026 and it resulted in the cancellation of the 13.06.2025 order with immediate effect on July 31, 2026. Referring to this, the State argued that an administrative order that had been cancelled could not service as a legal foundation for claiming parity.
Observations by the High Court:
After examining the records, the HC bench observed that in the case of the petitioners, the 24-month study leave had been sanctioned and availed under the regime that applied at that time, before the order dated 03.03.2025.
In this regard, the Court also clarified that enhancing a permissible ceiling does not automatically confer an enforceable right to retrospective enlargement.
The High Court held that merely because the Government subsequently enhanced the permissible period, it cannot be sufficient reason to reopen the leave which had already been sanctioned and availed under the earlier regime.
"The subsequent communication dated 06.04.2026 also has to be read in this context wherein it has been clarified that the order dated 03.03.2025 shall apply to Doctors who proceeds for higher studies after obtaining due permission/NOC after the said date. Thus, it is crystal clear that by the communication dated 6.4.2026 the State Government has only clarified the order dated 3.3.2025 in clear terms and nothing has been added/ omitted, therefore, the plea taken by the petitioners that the communication dated 6.4.2026 has not been issued by order and in name of the Hon’ble Governor of Chhattisgarh is not tenable," it observed.
"On a conjoint reading of the order dated 03.03.2025 and the subsequent communication dated 06.04.2026, this Court finds that the latter does not purport to repeal, rescind or substantially amend the earlier order. It is explanatory of the field of operation of the relaxation and facilitates its implementation," further noted the bench.
It was observed by the Court that the petitioners sought to derive a right to an additional 12 months study leave from the order dated 03.03.2025. But by the time the said order came into existence, their original 24-month study leave had already been sanctioned and availed, noted the bench.
"What the petitioners seek, therefore, is not protection of an existing right but creation of an additional entitlement by giving retrospective operation to a subsequent relaxation. Such a claim cannot be accepted in the absence of clear words in the order dated 03.03.2025. The plea of legitimate expectation also does not assist the petitioners. Legitimate expectation cannot be invoked to create a substantive right contrary to the terms of the governing rules or to give retrospective effect to a subsequent relaxation. The petitioners could legitimately expect their cases to be considered in accordance with the rules and orders applicable to them, but could not claim as of right that a later relaxation would reopen their earlier leave sanction. The plea of discrimination under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution also has to be examined in the context of the relevant dates and circumstances. Merely because another employee may have been granted the benefit of 36 months' study leave does not establish discrimination unless such employee and the petitioner are similarly situated in all material particulars. For determining such similarity, the date of NOC/permission, the date and nature of sanction of study leave and the regime under which the sanction was made are material considerations. A comparison divorced from these circumstances cannot furnish a foundation for a claim under Articles 14 and 16," it held.
The Court held that petitioners cannot claim parity merely on the basis of an administrative benefit allegedly extended to another person, particularly when the claim itself arises from a subsequent relaxation which was not in existence when the petitioners' study leave was sanctioned and availed.
In this context, the Court also pointed out that the grant of study leave is governed by the statutory rules. "The Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot enlarge the benefit of a relaxation beyond the terms in which the competent authority has granted it," clarified the bench.
"Having considered the order dated 03.03.2025 in its entirety, the chronology of the petitioners' cases, the subsequent communication dated 06.04.2026, the departmental order dated 13.06.2025 relied upon by the petitioners and its subsequent cancellation, as also the principles governing retrospective operation noticed hereinabove, this Court finds that the petitioners have not been able to establish any legal entitlement to have their earlier sanctioned and availed period of 24 months' study leave retrospectively enlarged by a further period of 12 months. The order dated 03.03.2025 enhances the permissible ceiling of study leave to 36 months for the cases falling within its terms and conditions; it does not expressly or by necessary implication reopen every earlier sanction of 24 months or convert a subsequent period of extraordinary leave into study leave. The order dated 13.06.2025, having subsequently been cancelled, cannot furnish an independent or subsisting basis for claiming such parity. Likewise, the communication dated 06.04.2026, being explanatory of the applicability of the parent order, does not alter its substantive scope. The petitioners, therefore, cannot derive an additional substantive entitlement merely from he subsequent relaxation, nor can such entitlement be created by invoking parity under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution in the absence of material identity of the governing circumstances," observed the bench.
The Court noted that the entire claim of the petitioners, proceeds upon an assumption that the order dated 03.03.2025 automatically converted every pre-existing 24-month study-leave sanction into a 36-month sanction. "Such an interpretation is neither borne out from the language of the order nor consistent with the chronology of the present cases," it noted.
"In the batch of these writ Petitions, the Petitioners are seeking a direction towards the respondents’ authorities to extend the benefit of the order dated 03.03.2025 by granting the study leave from 24 months to 36 months. On examinations of the facts discussed above, I hold that the Government order dated 03.03.2025 operates as a subsequent relaxation to the candidates who applied for study leave on or after 03.03.2025. The said order was not for all the candidates like the petitioners who had already availed the study leave much prior to passing of the said order. It cannot be invoked with retrospectively enlarge the period of study leave already sanctioned and availed by the petitioners prior to its issuance. The communication dated 06.04.2026 in specific terms clarified that the benefit of the order dated 3.3.2025 will be extended from the said date only...The communication dated 06.04.2026, when read with the parent order dated 03.03.2025, is therefore liable to be understood as a clarification/ implementation of the earlier relaxation and not as an independent order withdrawing any vested benefit from the petitioners," observed the bench.
Accordingly, it concluded, "Consequently, the petitioners have failed to establish that the impugned action of the respondents is arbitrary, discriminatory, retrospective or otherwise contrary to the applicable statutory framework. No case for issuance of a writ directing the respondents to extend the petitioners' already availed 24 months' study leave by a further period of 12 months is, therefore, made out."
To view the order, click on the link below:
https://medicaldialogues.in/pdf_upload/2026/10/03/chhattisgarh-hc-study-leave-478137.pdf
