Monocef NSQ Case: HC Rejects Aristo Labs Plea, Confirms Trial Before Magistrate

The case was heard by Hon’ble Justice Sanjay Dhar, who examined whether the complaint alleging offenses under Section 18(a)(i) read with Section 27(d) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act could validly proceed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar. The petition also questioned whether statutory procedure regarding sampling and testing had been followed and whether cognizance had been taken mechanically.

Justice Dhar reserved the matter on November 10, 2025, and pronounced the detailed judgment on November 14, 2025.

The dispute originated from a sample of the injectable drug “Monocef,” allegedly manufactured by the petitioner, lifted by the Drugs Inspector, Anantnag, in 2012. As the complaint narrates, the sample, bearing Batch No. D16B271, was taken from a trader’s premises and sent to the Government Analyst, Jammu, who declared it “not of standard quality” on April 9, 2012. The transaction trail revealed multiple layers of distribution, ultimately tracing the product back to Aristo Laboratories Pvt. Ltd., Nani Daman. The prosecution alleged that after the manufacturer was informed and sanction was obtained, the complaint was filed.

The petitioner, however, contended that the entire prosecution was illegal. It argued that the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, lacked jurisdiction under Section 32 of the Act, which ordinarily mandates trial of Chapter IV offences by a Court of Sessions. It was further submitted that the Drugs Inspector had violated Section 23(4) by failing to provide a portion of the sample to the manufacturer, thereby depriving it of the statutory right to seek re-testing. The petitioner additionally claimed that the initial cognizance order was “cryptic” and indicated no application of mind.

The Union Territory administration countered these arguments, maintaining that the law clearly permits a specially empowered Judicial Magistrate to try offences punishable up to three years’ imprisonment, irrespective of their placement under Chapter IV of the Act. It also asserted that the manufacturer was indeed provided a portion of the sample and had even responded in writing, disputing the analyst’s findings. The respondents reminded the Court that upon the manufacturer’s request, the trial court had sent the sample to the Central Drugs Laboratory, Kolkata, where it again failed the quality test.

After examining the record, the High Court agreed with the prosecution’s position. Justice Dhar referred to Section 36-A of the Act, observing that offences punishable with imprisonment “not exceeding three years” fall squarely within the jurisdiction of a Judicial Magistrate First Class specially empowered by the State Government. To reinforce this statutory framework, the Court wrote that “if an offence, which is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, the same would be triable by a Judicial Magistrate of first class specially empowered by the Government in this behalf in spite of the fact that the said offence may fall within Chapter-IV of the Act.” The Court highlighted that the State’s SRO 44 of 2006 empowers all Judicial Magistrates to try such cases.

On the question of sample handling, the Court found the petitioner’s assertion factually incorrect, noting that “a portion of the sample was furnished to the petitioner in terms of communication dated 25.06.2012”, and that the petitioner had itself responded on July 20 and 23 asserting the product’s quality. The Court emphasised that even after re-testing by the Central Drugs Laboratory, the drug remained “not of standard quality,” making the challenge unsustainable.

The Court also examined the allegation that cognizance had been taken mechanically. While the initial order by the Mobile Magistrate, Anantnag, was arguably terse, the High Court noted that after the case was transferred, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Anantnag, had passed a fresh order on October 17, 2015, demonstrating clear application of mind. Justice Dhar pointed out that the Magistrate had reviewed the complaint afresh and recorded that prima facie offences under Section 18(a)(i) were made out before issuing process.

Concluding the judgment, the Court held that none of the petitioner’s grounds had merit. In unambiguous terms, it declared: “For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any merit in this petition. The same is dismissed accordingly. Interim direction, if any, shall stand vacated with immediate effect.”