Delhi HC Rejects Reddy Pharma Plea Against Dr Reddy's Over REDDY Trademark

A Division Bench of Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Om Prakash Shukla held that the issues raised in the review petition essentially sought reconsideration of findings already returned by the Court and did not disclose an error apparent on the face of the record warranting exercise of review jurisdiction.

The dispute traces back to a suit instituted by Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. (DRL) against Reddy Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (RPL) concerning use of the expression “REDDY” in the pharmaceutical business. DRL had sought, among other reliefs, an injunction restraining RPL from passing off its goods under the expression, along with relief relating to copyright infringement, rendition of accounts, damages and delivery up. On September 13, 2013, the Single Judge granted a permanent injunction against RPL, following which RPL approached the Division Bench in appeal.

Parallel to the civil litigation, DRL had initiated rectification proceedings before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB), seeking removal of RPL’s registered trademark “REDDY”. On October 29, 2013, the IPAB ordered removal of the mark from the Register of Trade Marks. RPL subsequently challenged the IPAB decision before the Delhi High Court. Since validity of the registration had a bearing on the rights claimed by RPL in the passing-off proceedings, the High Court considered the challenge to the IPAB order before deciding the connected appeal.

Through its common judgment dated May 18, 2026, the Division Bench dismissed both RPL’s challenge to the IPAB order and its appeal arising from the civil suit. While examining the IPAB decision, the Court had found that although the IPAB had not expressly referred to Sections 9 and 11 of the Trade Marks Act, its findings concerning confusion, false trade connection, dishonest adoption and absence of bona fide adoption substantially addressed the grounds contemplated under those provisions. The Court had also held that even if the IPAB's reliance on Section 158 of the Companies Act, 1956 was erroneous, its other findings independently justified removal of the mark.

Turning to the passing-off dispute, the Court had considered documentary material including newspaper publications, sales invoices and advertisement invoices, along with an admission made by a witness concerning reputation. It also examined RPL's contention that “REDDY” was a common surname and that its adoption was bona fide. The Court, however, considered the adoption against the backdrop of the parties' commercial relationship, knowledge of the competing pharmaceutical business, the Agency Agreement dated April 1, 2003, subsequent use of “REDDY” in the same field of activity and other surrounding circumstances. On cumulative consideration, it had concluded that bona fide adoption and use had not been established and described the adoption and use of the mark as “tainted from the outset.”

Seeking review of the May 18 judgment, Senior Advocate Chander M. Lall, appearing for RPL, raised three principal grounds which, according to the company, constituted errors apparent on the face of the record.

First, RPL argued that the Court had erroneously relied upon the IPAB decision while determining the passing-off action even though, according to it, the IPAB findings could not constitute evidence in such proceedings.

Second, RPL challenged the Court's findings concerning goodwill and reputation. It contended that the Court had effectively based its finding of goodwill and reputation on a contractual arrangement between the parties, which, according to RPL, could not by itself establish goodwill for the purpose of a passing-off action. RPL further pointed to an invoice of DRL dating from 1997 and argued that this was subsequent to RPL's alleged adoption of the mark in 1996 and therefore could not establish prior use. It argued that these errors had resulted in the Court incorrectly distinguishing the Supreme Court's ruling in Brihan Karan Sugar Syndicate Pvt. Ltd. v. Yashwantrao Mohite Krushna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana.

Third, RPL contended that the Division Bench had wrongly referred to an interim order passed by the Single Judge and argued that an interim order could not form the basis of a final decision in an appeal. It further objected to the Court's reference to Sections 9 and 11 of the Trade Marks Act, arguing that these provisions had not been invoked by the IPAB and were effectively introduced for the first time by the Division Bench, depriving RPL of an opportunity to meet that point.

Opposing the review petition, Senior Advocate Swathi Sukumar, appearing for Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, submitted that none of the grounds raised by RPL could satisfy the legal threshold required for review.

DRL relied on the limited nature of review jurisdiction, referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Malleeswari v. K. Suguna and Anr., and argued that RPL was effectively attempting to reopen and reargue issues that had already been considered and decided in the May 18 judgment. The respondent maintained that disagreement with the Court's assessment of evidence or legal conclusions could not be converted into an “error apparent” warranting review.

Rejecting RPL's first argument, the Division Bench clarified that its earlier judgment had not treated the IPAB order as evidence establishing goodwill or reputation in the passing-off action. The writ petition challenging the IPAB order had first been examined independently, and the IPAB decision was upheld after the Court found no apparent error of law. Thereafter, the appeal arising from the civil suit was separately considered according to principles governing passing off.

The Court emphasised that its findings in the passing-off appeal were based independently on material concerning goodwill, reputation, prior use and surrounding circumstances. Therefore, the mere reference to IPAB proceedings could not be construed to mean that the IPAB decision was treated as the sole evidence of goodwill. According to the Bench, RPL's disagreement with the manner in which the two connected proceedings were dealt with did not amount to an error apparent on the face of the record.

The Bench further observed that passing-off law does not mandate that goodwill must be demonstrated exclusively through Chartered Accountant-certified records. Reputation and public association, it held, can emerge from a “mosaic of evidence” demonstrating actual trade, promotion and public recognition. The Court distinguished the Supreme Court ruling relied upon by RPL on the ground that, unlike the evidentiary situation in that case, the present dispute involved primary and contemporaneous evidence concerning use, sales, advertising and market recognition that had substantially remained unchallenged.

The Court also rejected the contention concerning the 1997 invoice, explaining that the invoice was not treated as the sole foundation for determining prior use. Rather, the conclusion was based on an assessment of the evidence as a whole, including material relating to goodwill, reputation and prior use.

On RPL's objection concerning reliance on an earlier interim order, the Bench clarified that the final conclusions in its May judgment had not been founded upon that interim order. The decision was reached after considering the evidence and rival submissions, and a reference to an earlier interim order did not create an error apparent on the face of the record.

The Court similarly declined to accept the objection concerning Sections 9 and 11 of the Trade Marks Act. It noted that the IPAB's factual findings concerning confusion, false trade connection, dishonest adoption and absence of bona fide proprietorship independently supported removal of the trademark from the Register. The Bench also noted that Section 57 had to be considered with reference to the statutory grounds contained in Sections 9 and 11 when determining whether a mark had been wrongly entered or continued to remain on the Register.

Concluding that the grounds raised by RPL were essentially an attempt to secure reconsideration of findings already made, the Delhi High Court held that no case had been established for exercising review jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the Division Bench dismissed Reddy Pharmaceuticals Ltd.'s review petition, leaving its May 18, 2026 judgment undisturbed. The Court, however, corrected a clerical error in paragraph 201 of the earlier judgment, where W.P.(C) 6461/2018 had mistakenly been mentioned instead of W.P.(C) 654/2014, clarifying that the correction had no impact on the substance of the judgment.

The Court ruled:

“We, therefore, are of the opinion that no case for review of our judgment dated 18.05.2026 is made out.”

It further ordered:

“The review petition is accordingly dismissed.”

The Bench also clarified regarding the clerical correction:

“The said correction does not affect the judgment otherwise rendered by us.”